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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ROOSEVELT CITY, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DAVID P. SLIM, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Appellate No. 20021031-CA 
Trial No. 022000723-TC 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In the Eighth District Court's assumption of Due 
Process of Law, Article 1, Section 7, Utah Constitution 
and jurisdiction of the validity of Stipulation, dated 
August 31, 1992 (attached herein), between Ute Tribe, 
and the State of Utah, Duchesne County, and Uintah 
County, and Roosevelt City, and Duchesne City. 
And Supported by federal court order, In Ute 
Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, Civil No. C 75-408. No. 
860243 (Utah 1992), copy of Stipulation was produced 
to Roosevelt City, the signed document which purported 
waived Roosevelt City Corporation's sovereign immunity 
from action on any conflict to be resolved in Open 
Courts, Article I, Section 11, Utah Constitution. 
Defendant Slim as an Navajo Indian is guaranteed 
2 
access to the courts for actions against Roosevelt City 
non-Indians, is outcome on equal protection grounds. 
In Paiz v. Hughes, 417 P. 51 (N.M. 1966); and in Bonnet 
v. Seekins, 243 P. 2d 317 (Mt. 1962). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The Eighth District Court correctly concluded 
signed, contract constitute an express, unequivocal 
waiver of Plaintiff Roosevelt City's common law 
immunity from court actions. Confederated Tribes v. 
State of Washington, 938 F. 2d 136 (Cir. 1991), The 
prohibitions on speeding, and driving without license, 
is a civil/regulatory and not Criminal/prohibitory. In 
State v. Johnson, 598 N.W. 2d 680 (Minn. 1999); State 
v. Stone, 572 N.W. 2d 725 (Minn. 1997); State v. 
R.M.H., 617 N.W. 2d (Minn. 2000). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff Roosevelt City has produced unilateral, 
unsigned document purporting to be Stipulated. Signed 
Stipulation alleges to waive Roosevelt City sovereign 
immunity from action and includes provision allowing 
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dispute to be settled under, "No law" shall be passed 
granting Irrevocably any Franchise, Privilege or 
immunity. Article 1, Section 23. Utah Constitution. 
In the Fourteenth Amendment of U.S. Constitution 
provide all persons, born or naturalized in the United 
States .... are citizens of the United States and of 
the State wherein they reside. Indians are entitled to 
the full protection. Goodluck v. Apache County, 317 F. 
Supp. 13 (D. Ariz. 975), aff'd sub nom, Apache County 
v. United States, et al., 429 U.S. 876 (1976). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Action arises from Stiplation, dated August 31, 
1992, by Ute Tribe of Indians, as federally recognized 
Tribe. Plaintiff Roosevelt City allege and prepared 
the contract and alterations in Stipulation clause, and 
has submitted same to Ute Tribe for signing. Defendant 
Slim assumed Ute Tribe signed Stipulation, which also 
stated for these parties not to violate Federal 
Statutes set by Congress. Plaintiff Roosevelt City and 
Ute Indian Tribe possess the copies of contract that 
was signed by the party. Plaintiff Roosevelt City 
4 
Stipulation was entered into, and signed City Attorney. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFF ROOSEVELT CITY'S IMMUNITY WAIVER 
WAS SIGNED IN STIPULATION, AND CONSIDERED 
WAIVED, DATED AUGUST 31, 1992 THIS WAS SIGNED 
Ute Indian Tribe, as nation state, are granted 
immunity privileges the sovereign States possess. 
Wippert v. Blackfeet, 859 P. 2d 420, 426 (Mt. 1993). 
Tribal immunity is matter of federal law and is not 
subject to Utah State's authority. Kiowa Tribe of 
Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies Inc. 523 U.S. 
751, 756 (1998). Thus, tribes are immune from action 
unless specifically authorized by Congress or consented 
to by the Tribe itself. Wippert v. Blackfeet Tribe, 
859 P. 2d 420, at 426 (Mt. 1993). Tribal waiver of 
sovereign immunity must be unequivocal and cannot be 
implied in, Thompson v. Crow Tribe, 962 P. 2d 577 (Mt. 
1998). There is strong presumption against waiver of 
tribal sovereign immunity. Demontiney v. U.S. et al., 
255 F. 3d 801, 811 (C.A. 9 2001). 
II. DEFENDANT SLIM AS NAVAJO INDIAN DID MEET 
THE BURDEN OF WAIVER OF PLAINTIFF 
5 
ROOSEVELT CITYfS IMMUNITY 
Plaintiff Roosevelt City claims, presumed to not 
speak the truth. Presumption overcome matter, which 
may be prove truthfulness. According to Utah statute, 
be rebutted matters including, but not limited to, 
witness bias, witness character for the truth, the 
honesty, or integrity, any evidence contracting. That 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. 63-30-10 
(1997), provides, in relevent part, as follows; 
Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for injury proximately 
caused by a negligent act or ommission of 
an employee committed within the scope of 
employment except if the injury arises out 
of, in connection with, or results from; 
(1) the exercise or performance or the 
failure to exercise or perform a descretionary 
function, whether or not the discretion is 
abused 
Utah precedent interpreting and applying discretionary 
exception articulated policies served by exception, the 
discretionary function exception shields governmental 
acts and decisions impacting large numbers of people in 
myriad of unforeseen ways from individual and class 
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legal actions. Keegan v. State, 896 P. 2d 618, 620 
(Utah 1995). Immunity is waived, the liability of 
governmental entity is determined as entity was private 
person. Utah Code Ann. 63-30-4(1)(b). The Ute Indian 
tribe contend facts themselves of truthfulness of the 
witnesses. Roosevelt City has bias interest in outcome 
of this case. Bias interest as strong truthfulness of 
any evidence, allow to draw existence of fact. 
Defendant Slim would like to draw interpretation 
from evidence provided contract valid waiver of 
Plaintiff Roosevelt City's immunity overlooks fact, 
such finding would be contrary to previous rulings, 
cannot be implied, Thompson v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 
962 P. 2d 577 (Mt. 1998), immunity was express waiver 
of subject matter jurisdiction. 
Burden is on the government to prove defendant is 
one race and victim is another, in order to establish 
criminal jurisdiction under, United States v. Lawrence, 
51 F. 3d 150 (9th Cir. 1995). Indictment must specify 
races of victim and defendant, in United States v. 
Prentiss, 256 F. 3d 971 (10th Cir. 2001)(en banc), on 
7 
remand, 273 F. 3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2001). 
III. DISMISSAL OF CASE WAS PROPER ONCE APPEALS 
COURT DETERMINES ROOSEVELT CITY LACKED 
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OF THE 
STIPULATION AMONG PARTIES IS PROPER 
IN UTE TRIBAL COURT 
In the Eighth District Court that lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction over Ute Indian Tribe did not 
properly dismiss this case. Jurisdictional defenses 
implicate fundamental power of authority of court to 
determine to hear an issue, Wippert v. Blackfeet Tribe, 
859 P. 2d 420 (1993), determines it lacks jurisdiction, 
it can take no further action other than to dismiss it. 
This contract contain choice of law provision 
stating and construed under Ute Tribal law, should be 
determined in Ute Tribal Court. If Eighth District 
Court jurisdiction over Indians or activities on Indian 
lands would interfere with tribal sovereignty and self-
government, which Plaintiff Roosevelt City is generally 
divested of jurisdiction as matter of federal law. In 
Iowa Mutual v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 15 (1987). It 
does not matter whether acts giving rise the to claim 
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occurred on reservation or off of reservation. Littel 
v. Nakai, 344 F. 2d 486, 490 (9th Cir. 1965). In Littel 
the Court found that in suit of tribal member versus 
tribal member, even though some of the activities 
giving rise to claim took place off of reservation, 
the heart of the matter involved tribal members, and 
Nonmember Indians jurisdiction by either federal or 
state courts would be disruptive of Tribal self-
government. Bottomly v. Passamaquoddy, 599 F. 2d 1061 
(1st Cir. 1979); Oklahoma v. Tax CommTn v. Citizen 
Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505 (1991). 
The Two part tests to determine whether state 
court can assert jurisdiction of matter arising on 
reservation. General Constructors Inc. v. Chewculator 
Inc., 21 P. 2d 604 (Mt. 2001). First, State ex rel, 
Iron Bear v. District Court, 512 P. 2d 1292 (Mt. 1973), 
the test determines whether the state court may assume 
subject matter jurisdiction whether the Ute tribal 
adjudicatory sovereignty over civil dispute airising on 
reservation may be involved. The test involves three 
prong test; if either of the first two prongs are 
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established, the state lacks jurisdiction. The three 
prongs are as follows; 
(1) the federal treaties and statutes applicable 
has preempted state jurisdiction; 
(2) the exercise of state jurisdiction would 
interfere with reservation self-government; and 
(3) the Tribal Court is currently exercising 
jurisdiction or the exercised jurisdiction in such a 
manner as to preempt state jurisdiction. 
The Second, the two-part in White Mountain Apache 
Tribe v. Bracker, 488 U.S. 136 (1980), to determines 
whether State may assume jurisdiction in regulatory 
matter under the test must ask; 
(1) whether the assertion of subject matter 
jurisdiction by Roosevelt City's administrative and 
judicial tribunal is preempted by federal law, and 
(2) whether the assertion of subject matter 
jurisdiction by Roosevelt City's administrative and 
judicial tribunals would unlawfully infringe on Ute 
Tribe's right to make laws and be ruled by them. 
This dispute at issue or matter involves contract 
between Ute Indian Tribe, Ute tribal members, and there 
Nonmember Indians. The authority to enter contract, is 
subject matter of alleged contract, and dispute arose 
from within Ute Indian Reservation. 
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Under Ute Indian Tribe's interest in this self-
government for civil matters arising within Ute Indian 
reservation boundaries can be implicated in one of two 
ways; (1) when state or federal court resolves dispute 
that infringes upon Ute Tribe's right to adjudicate 
controversies arising within Ute Tribal court, and 
(2) the dispute itself calls into question validity or 
propriety of an act fairly attributable to Ute Tribe as 
government body. Milbank Mutual Insurance Co. v. 
Eagleman 705 P. 2d 1117, 1119-20 (Mt. 1985). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on foregoing, In Eighth District Court may 
properly dismissed case for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. Plaintiff has simply failed to meet the 
burden of proof required to show that Ute Indian Tribe 
has waived sovereign immunity from action. The signed, 
unilateral Stipulation, dated August 31, 1992, that 
does constitute this clear and unequivocal waiver of 
Roosevelt City's immunity from action. That in the 
Eighth District Court that concluded Roosevelt City had 
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subject matter jurisdiction to hear case and dismissed 
the Stipulation. Ute Tribal Court is the proper Court 
jurisdiction over this matter because resolution of 
this case requires interpretation of Indian Tribal 
laws and ability to govern under those laws. The Utah 
Appeals Court should therefore Order this Eighth 
District Court Case Dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted this ^v\ day of April, 2003. 
David P. ^ SrimT^Attorney Pro-S 
STIPULATION 
This stipulation is made this 3j[ day of August, 1992, by and 
between the State of Utah [hereafter, "the State11 ], the County of 
Duchesne, the County of Uinta, the City of Roosevelt, the City of 
Duchesne [hereafter collectively referred to as "the local 
defendants1'] and the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uinrah and Ouray 
Reservation, Utah [hereafter, "the Tribe"], through the parties' 
legal counsel. 
The Utah Suprera Court's decision in State v, Perank, No. 
860243 (July 17, 1992) conflicts virh the. decision of the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Ute Indian ^ribe v. Utah, 773 F.2d 
(10th Cir« 1SS5) fen bar.c) , cert, denied, U.S. (1936) insofar as 
each decision purports to sen forth the boundaries of the Uintah 
Valley Reservation (now a part of the Uintah and Ouray 
Reservation). In order to avoid potential chaos and avoid 
jurisdictional uncertainty in the Uintah 3asin, the State, local 
defendants and Tribe enter into the following stipulation. 
1. The State, local defendants, their officers, agents, 
employees and any person acting in their behalf shall refrain froa 
enforcing the Utah Supreme Court's decision in State v. Perank. No. 
8602433 (Utah July 17, 1992), and shall refrain from exercising 
criminal jurisdiction over Indians who are members of the Ute 
Indian Tribe or any other federally recognized 'Indian Tribe or 
civil jurisdiction over actions involving the Ute Indian Tribe or 
nembers of the Ute Indian Tribe, or interfering, in any way, with 
the Tribe's exercise of such civil or criminal jurisdiction within 
the exterior boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, Utah, 
Stipulation ntg Indian Tribe v. Utah 
August: 18, 19 92 
page 2 
as those boundaries were set fcrth by the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 773 F.2d 10, (10th Cir. 1985) 
fen bare), cert, denied. U.S. (1G86). 
2. The Tribe shall exercise criminal jurisdiction over 
Indians who are ©embers of the Ute Indian Tribe or any other 
federally recognized Indian Tribe and shall exercise civil and 
regulatory jurisdiction over Indians and non-Indians to the extent 
permitted by law within the exterior boundaries of the Uintah and 
Curay Reservation, Utah, as those boundaries were set fcrth by the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 77 3 
F.2d 10 (10th Cir. 1535) (en banc), cert, denied. U.S. (1986). 
3. This stipulation shall expire on the date immediately 
following the date en which the Federal District Court for the 
District of Utah issues its decision en the Tribe's Renewed Motion 
for Injunctive Relief in Civil No. C-75-40B unless further extended 
in writing by the parties or by order of the Federal District Court 
for the District of Utah. 
Stipulation Uta Indian Tribe v. Utah 
August. 18, 19 9 2 
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4- Nothing contained herein shall prejudice or be deemed a 
waiver of the claims or defenses of any party to this stipulation. 
State of Utah (j Counsel, y£e Indian Tribe 
Harr'yj Souvall, Artofcney^ Herbert $ille£pie, ttttorn^y 
Uintrd County, Utah Duchesne County, Utah 
Attodney, City of I^csevr^t Attorney, City o^/Duchesne 
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS. "&A ° / . fyft?. 
V <& *%> '^  
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION <^ N. •'#.. < 
UTE INDIAN TRIBE of the Uintah and 
Ouray Reservation, Utah, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendant in Intervention, 
and 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, a political subdivision 
of the State of Utah; UINTAH COUNTY, 
a political subdivision of the State of 
Utah; ROOSEVELT CITY, a municipal 
corporation; and DUCHESNE CITY, a 
municipal corporation, 
Defendants, 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and PARADOX 
PRODUCTION CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, 
Amicus Curiae. 
V % 
\ 
Civil No. C 75-40S 
ORDER 
No. 360243 (Utah 1992) 
This matter cane before the Court on the Motion of the Ute 
Indian Tribe for a Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary 
Injunction. All parties to the proceeding received copies of the 
Tribe's pleadings in advance of a hearing held on Monday# August 3, 
1992 at 3:30 p.m. and were represented by legal counsel at the 
hearing. 
At the Court's request, attorneys for the Tribe had spoken 
with the State Attorney General's office prior to the hearing for 
the purpose of determining whether the parties fcould reach an 
agreement on the issue presented to this Court by the Tribe's 
motion for a preliminary injunction. A stipulation was reached, 
whereby the State agreed, on behalf of itself and its political 
subdivisions, to refrain from enforcing the Utah Supreme Court's 
iecision in qtate v. Perahk, No. 360243 (Utah July 17, 1592); froa 
ixercisinc civil or criminal jurisdiction in a manner that 
oonflicts with federal law within the exterior boundaries of the 
Uintah and Ouray Reservation, as these boundaries were set forth by 
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 773 
F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc). cert, denied, 479 U.S. 994 
(198 6) ; or from interfering, in any way, with the Tribe's exercise 
of criminal, civil and regulatory jurisdiction, consistent with 
federal and tribal law, within the exterior boundaries of the 
Uintah and Ouray Reservation, as those boundaries were set forth by 
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Ute Indian Tribe, supra. 
Counsel for the State and for the Tribe stated, for the 
record, their-respective understandings of the agreement, .which had 
not yet then been memorialized. No objection to the agreement was 
lodged by counsel for the political subdivisions or amicus curiae 
United States. 
The Courr hereby incorporates by reference the attached 
stipulation between rhe State of Utah, County of Duchesne, County 
of Uintah, City of Roosevelt, City Of Duchesne and Ute Indian Tribe 
of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, Utah, and hereby OPJDERS that 
the parties shall ccaply with the provisions of said stipulation 
until this Court issues its decision on the merits of the Tribe's 
Renewed Koticn for Injunctive Relief or until such*, other date as is 
fixed by agreement between the parties or by order of this Court. 
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D a t e d t h i s day of August:, 1 9 9 2 , nunc pro tunc August 3 , 
.992 . 
Eruce S. Jenkins, Chief Judge 
United States District Court 
District of Utah 
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SERVICE BY MAILING 
David P. Slim, Certify that on X H > day of 
April, 2003, served copy of Defendant/Appellant's 
Answer brief, by first class mail with sufficient 
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Clark B. Allred 
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121 West Main Street 
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David P. Attorney Pro-Se 
